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ABSTRACT 
While a redistribution of property rights might enable society to capture potential efficiency 
gains, the inevitable distributional conflicts make the transformation far from automatic. As 
individuals who would be adversely affected by the change seek a priori contracts for compensation, 
those who anticipate net benefits must decide how much to pay, who should pay, and who should 
receive their payments. As free riding, strategic bargaining, or the expensive monitoring and 
enforcement of contracts ultimately block voluntary agreements, society becomes unable to adopt 
the new institutional structure that promised to increase social wealth. If distributional conflicts 
become so severe and threaten to prevent the implementation of an income-enhancing property 
rights arrangement, what type of mechanisms will evolve to work these conflicts out? When 
voluntary negotiations break down, the government is usually called in to implement publically what 
individuals could not accomplish in the private sector. How, therefore, does the political process 
influence the path of institutional and economic development? This paper explores the dynamics of 
institutional change in an attempt to explain better why the adoption of potentially productive 
institutions are delayed and why inefficient ones persist. 
The paper provides a micro-analysis of the transformation from an open range to a closed 
range policy in postbellum Georgia. The traditional agricultural practice in Georgia from colonial 
times until after the Civil War allowed animals to roam the countryside freely and forced farmers to 
erect fences around their growing crops. All unfenced land, therefore, was considered common 
pasture that could be used by anyone. After the Civil War there was a concerted effort to eradicate 
the open range policy and to force all livestock owners to fence in their animals instead of forcing 
farmers to fence them out of the growing crops. According to estimates provided in the paper, 
switching to the closed range would have generated net benefits for specific regions for Georgia, but 
distributional conflicts, coupled with high transaction costs, made a voluntary agreement to close the 
range unattainable. 
The empirical evidence shows that the Georgia legislature's role in facilitating the closing of 
the range was crucial. First, the legislature allowed countywide referenda on what became known as 
the fence question. Upon seeing that majority rule generally failed as a mechanism to facilitate the 
adoption of a relatively profitable institution, the legislative body manipulated the voting mechanism 
so as to guarantee compensation for a subset of the expected losers. By forcing the transfer of 
income from expected winners to expected losers, the state legislature was able to facilitate the 
adoption of the closed range policy that promoted more rapid agricultural development in 
postbellum Georgia. 
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Social scientists would agree that attempts to modify economic, political, or social 
institutions represent the "rational" efforts of individuals searching for economic progress. What 
forces drive individuals or groups to seek alterations in their institutional environment is a debate 
that has yet to be settled. "Radical" historians, for example, claim that change is always rooted in 
class conflict in which economic elites use their (political) power to impose institutions that enable 
them to extract the "labor surplus" more easily. This view sharply conflicts with many economists' 
notion that exogenous shocks, such as relative price changes or discoveries of new opportunities for 
gain, create an incentive for society, or a subset thereof, to adopt a different institutional regime that 
promises to promote economic development. While both approaches claim to identify the 
conditions necessary to set the process of institutional change into motion, neither theory explicitly 
models or seriously discusses the transition from status quo to terminus. Whether economic change 
stems from a motivation to capture potential efficiency gains or from the machinations of a dominant 
class bent on expropriating the labor surplus, it is remiss to ignore the process of such a change. 
"New institutional economists" have emphasized the significant role that institutional change 
plays in determining economic prosperity, but, at the same time, they have paid little attention to the 
nuances that surround the transformation. Claiming that "the emergence of new property rights 
takes place in response to the desires of the interacting persons for adjustments to new benefit-cost 
possibilities" 1 does not explain how the change is ultimately realized. As if operating within a 
marlcet system, individuals, Coase asserts, will realize potential efficiency gains and adopt the new, 
more efficient institutional regime that, presumably, will lead society toward economic expansion.2 
As Douglass North asserts: "Competition in the face of ubiquitous scarcity dictates that the more 
efficient institution, policy, or individual action will survive and the inefficient ones perish."3 The 
process of change, however, is portrayed as a "black box." We know that within the box there is a 
labyrinth that might impede the way of efficient institutional change and economic groWih, but this 
subtlety has been relegated to a position of secondary importance in the study of institutional change. 
When an income-enhancing institutional change has been obstructed, economists often 
blame transaction costs for blocking the movement. Realizing that a new institution would be more 
valuable than the old one is quite different from actually adopting the better regime. As individuals 
who would be adversely affected by the change seek a priori contracts for compensation, those who 
anticipate net benefits must decide how much to pay, who should pay, and who should receive their 
payments. If distributional conflicts must be resolved in the private sector, problems such as free 
riding, strategic bargaining, or expensive monitoring and enforcement of contracts can block 
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voluntary agreements and prohibit society from adopting a new institutional structure that promised 
to increase social wealth.4 Often, at the behest of the benefitting group, the government is called in 
to implement the new, income-generating institutional arrangement. But as the political power of 
the competing groups differs, nothing guarantees that the political solution adopted will the one that 
captures the entire expected efficiency gain or that resolves the distributional conflicts that ultimately 
prevented a voluntary, free market solution.5 Therefore, in studying the dynamics of institutional 
change, it is important to address the question of how the government influences the process of 
institutional and economic development. Moreover, how does the political solution differ from the 
one that would have emerged from a market environment where transaction costs were negligible? 
In an attempt to tackle these questions, this paper focuses on the changing of a property 
rights institution that was actively debated throughout the postbellum South - the closing of the open 
range. In particular, the paper concentrates on the closing of the Georgia range from 1872 through 
1890. The traditional agricultural practice in Georgia was to allow animals to roam the countryside 
freely and to force farmers to erect fences around their growing crops. In other words, all unfenced 
land was common pasture that could be used by anyone. After the Civil War, however, there was a 
concerted effort to eradicate the open range policy and to enforce strict property rights to all land -
fenced or unfenced, improved or unimproved. 
Georgia is a particularly interesting state to focus upon because it was extremely diverse 
geographically. As the state varied from the Appalachian mountains in the northern section to the 
fertile argillaceous loam of the middle section to the expansive tracts of pine trees and wiregrass in 
the southeast, differing economic interests developed concerning the closing of the range.6 Map 1 
shows the state broken down into six traditional regions.7 Counties in the Plantation and Upcountry 
regions, along with many counties in the Mountain region, were best suited for agricultural 
production, as the soil and climate made cotton production, in particular, profitable. In these highly 
improved counties, improved acreage ranged from as low as twenty-two percent to as high as 
fifty-eight percent of the total land mass. Conversely, the average share of improved acreage in the 
Wiregrass, Pine Barrens, and Coastal regions amounted to only about twelve percent. 
According to estimates presented in the paper, the closed range would have generated net 
benefits for many counties in the state, especially in the Plantation Belt and Upcountry, but most of 
these counties maintained the status quo. While the net benefits may have been positive, the 
transaction costs and distributional conflicts associated with voluntarily redefining access rights to 
unfenced land were prohibitive. Empirical evidence shows that the Georgia legislature's role in 
facilitating the institutional change was crucial. The Georgia legislature allowed county and, later, 
sub-county referenda on the fence question that reduced the transaction costs that prevented a 
voluntary agreement to dispense with the open range. Most importantly, the legislature promised to 
enforce sidepayments between expected winners and losers once the new law was adopted at the 
local level. The voting returns of the county and sub-county referenda show that voters cast their 
ballots for the option (the closed range or the status quo) that would maximize their expected net 
benefits. Furthermore, when compensation for a subset of the expected losers was guaranteed by the 
legislature, the data show that these voters responded as might be expected - they switched their 
votes from the status quo to the new institution. Although society was unable to achieve a Pareto 
superior solution to the fence problem in postbellum Georgia, this paper demonstrates the important 
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function that the Georgia legislature played in facilitating the closing of the range which, in tum, led 
to more rapid agricultural development in postbellum Georgia. 
The Georgia Open Range and the Call for Reform 
From colonial times until after the Civil War, Georgia law permitted citizens to allow their 
animals to graze on any land that was unfenced. As English emigrants arrived in America to find 
sparse population density and large tracts of unimproved land between farms, they found it desirable 
and economical to allow their animals to roam the countryside freely. It should be noted, however, 
that English common law did not require a man to fence his land against the intrusion of his 
neighbors' beasts. Rather, English common law viewed an individual's property as private and, 
thus, if a man's animals strayed onto the enclosed or unenclosed land of his neighbor, the animals 
were to be considered trespassers. 8 If a trespassing animal were destroying a farmer's crops, 
common law permitted him to impound or even kill the intruding animal, if necessary. Moreover, if 
the trespassing animal happened to damage any of the farmer's crops, under common law the farmer 
was permitted to sue the animal's owner for damages.9 Upon arriving in A.rnerica, however, 
colonists found the laws of their homeland too restrictive. Not only was it difficult and expensive to 
provide their animals with the proper pasturage, but it was impossible to watch them constantly as 
they foraged through nearby forests. The problems associated with allowing animals to rove the 
terrain freely were quickly realized - it was impossible to prevent livestock from trampling and 
eating the growing crops. The decision, therefore, was to require farmers to fence in their crops. Put 
another way, laws were created that forced farmers to fence out the animals.10
In 1655, for example, the Newbury, Massachusetts town council "ordered that all fences ... 
be mayde so sufficient as to keep out all manner of swyne and other cattle, great or small, and at 
whose fence or part of fence ,any swyne or other cattle shall breake through, the party owning the 
fence shall not on! y bear and suffer all damages, but shall further pay for each rod so insufficient, the 
somme of two shillings."11 But Newbury was not the only community to force farmers to erect and 
to maintain "lawful" fences around their crops, or else forgo any chance for compensation for 
damages caused by another's marauding animals. In fact, "in every state of the Union, from the 
earliest times, it ha[d] been made compulsory for landowners to maintain good fences for the 
protection of crops; to fence animals out, rather than to fence them in."12 Georgia's first fence law, 
passed in 1759, explicitly required that: 
all fences or enclosures ... that shall be made around or about any garden, orchard, rice 
ground, indigo field, plantation or settlement in this province, shall be six feet high from 
the ground when staked or ridered and from the ground to the height of three feet of every 
such fence or enclosure, the rails thereof shall not be more than four inches distant from 
each other; and that all fences or enclosures that shall consist of paling shall likewise be 
six feet from the ground and the pales thereof not more than two inches asunder: 
Provided always, that where any fence or enclosure shall be made with a ditch or trench, 
the same shall be four feet wide, and in that case the fence shall be six feet high from the 
bottom of the ditch. 13 
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Those whose fences did not adhere precisely to the letter of the fence law were subject to 
treble damages if they killed or injured an animal straying upon ill-fenced land. In the 1881 
decision of Hamilton v. Howard, lhe Georgia Supreme Court declared that a lawful fence had to rise 
five feet from the ground everywhere, rather than merely averaging !hat height.14 Furthermore, an 
1889 decision ruled that an agreement to dispense with a partition fence (one between two 
neighbors) was not the equivalent of a legal fence. Unless an actual fence were broken- not 
merely a contract or agreement to dispense wilh a fence or an agreement to treat a dividing line as a 
fence- it was illegal for a farmer to harm a stray.15 The Court's message throughout was clear: a 
legal fence was defined absolutely and no room for variations and exceptions existed. 
Whereas the open range seemed to have been an economical response to the antebellum 
demography and geography of America, the late antebellum and postbellum eras brought a new 
attitude toward lhe profitability of fencing out animals and fencing in crops. "Excessive Fencing is 
peculiarly an American abuse, which urgently cries for reform," clamored Horace Greeley, who was 
certainly not alone in blasting the fence law as "needless and indefensible. "16 Farmers - southern 
farmers in particular- were told to ask lhemselves: "Are we an agricultural or stockraising 
people ... ?"17 As !he editor of lhe Jackson county (Georgia) newspaper succinctly noted: "it is sad 
evidence of old fogyism, general ignorance and backwardness of agriculture in lhe South !hat such a 
law as that now in force can exist."18 Given the destruction caused by lhe Civil War, agricultural 
"progressives" argued that it was time for innovation. It was time to rethink age-old policies that no 
longer encouraged maximum agricultural efficiency. With confidence, reformers claimed that a 
"stock law," or the fencing in of animals instead of crops, would be lhe first step toward bringing 
soulhern farmers out of relative poverty and toward agricultural prosperity.19 
What would cause people to seek a change in the open range policy that was accepted 
practice for well over a century? Harold Demsetz, for example, argues that "property rights develop 
to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of 
internalization."20 Similarly, Lance Davis and Douglass North theorize that institutional change 
tends to come about when lhe net present value of a new regime of property rights exceeds that of 
the traditional set of rights. 21 As an economy progresses through time, the costs and benefits of each 
feasible institutional arrangement continouosly change, causing individuals and groups constantly to 
update !heir decisions concerning the appropriate arrangement for society. As late nineteenth 
century farmers in the South, in particular, witnessed lhe tangible and increasing loss of land, labor, 
and capital caused by the fence requirement, many began to argue that lhe traditional practice of 
allowing animals to forage freely was no longer compatible with maximum agricultural efficiency. 
Reformers believed that conditions had sufficiently changed to make it economical for farmers to 
fence in their own livestock, instead of forcing their neighbors to fence them out. When "the subject 
[was] .. . reduced to dollars and cents," fence reformers were convinced that agricultural prosperity 
- in fact, overall economic growlh - depended on their innovation. 22 
The open range, reformers argued, was an anachronism. They acknowledged that allowing 
animals to roam at will was once a tenable policy when farms were far between and population 
density was low. But as economic and demographic changes were developing in the postbellum 
period, many believed !hat the traditional fence law had outlived its purpose. As population 
expanded throughout the South, as blacks took advantage of their freedom to move, and as the 
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growth of the railroad network made it possible to market crops from previously isolated areas, the 
population density in many regions began to swell. Increased population density simultaneously 
increased the proportion of land under till and increased the number of animals freely roaming the 
countryside. Together, these effects of population growth increased the probability that one person's 
roving animals would destroy another's crops. Certainly, a farmer could sue if an animal destroyed 
his crops, but he had to have evidence of the trespass and it was also impossible for him to watch his 
fields constantly. Therefore, holding everything else constant, increased population density led to an 
increase in the relative costs of maintaining the open range policy and made fencing animals a more 
attractive option. 
The expansion of the railroad network in Georgia also increased the relative benefits 
associated with fence reform. Since railroad right of ways were not required to be fenced under 
Georgia law, trains often hit wandering animals. As railroad tracks increasingly began to lace the 
South and as demographic changes created a larger supply of animals roaming the countryside, the 
result was not surprising - many animals were destroyed, railroad cars were damaged, and 
passengers were injured. Throughout the late nineteenth century the Georgia Supreme Court was 
called upon to resolve the legal and economic problems created when livestock and train "contend 
for the same place at the same instant."23 The Court decided that as long as the railroad could show 
that it exercised "ordinary and reasonable diligence" in its attempt to avoid killing a wandering 
animal, then it could escape liability. In any case, whether the railroad was guilty or not, the killing 
of animals and the physical damage done to trains and passengers was a cost of maintaining the open 
range that grew over time. 
Figure 1 plots the time series of the length of railroad track in Georgia from 1860 to 1889, 
inclusive. After a seventy-three percent increase from the end of the Civil War to 1880, railroad 
coverage in Georgia expanded rapidly in the 1880s. That decade experienced another seventy-three 
percent increase in track mileage, from 2,459 miles in 1880 to 4,268 miles in 1889. The 
contemporary annual reports of railroad companies give some idea of the magnitude of the benefits 
that the railroad industry could have captured if the closed range had been instituted in 1880. A 
sample of six annual reports in the postbellum period from three companies suggests that railroads 
were forced to pay, on average, approximately $19.90 (in 1880 dollars) per track mile for livestock 
that was killed because of the railroad's negligence. 24 According to these data, if the closed range 
policy were instituted throughout Georgia in 1880, the railroad industry would have realized a net 
benefit of approximately one million dollars.25 Note that this figure does not consider the dollar 
amount spent on repairing damage to trains that hit livestock, the monetary value of medical 
attention given to injured passengers, and lawyers' fees. In addition, it does not in.elude the value of 
livestock killed in situations when the railroad was not deemed negligent. The expansion of the 
railroad in the latter part of the nineteenth century certainly raised the cost of keeping the open range 
relative to the closed range. 
When railroads arrived in areas previously without a connection, the opportunity cost 
associated with the fence law intensified, making the closed range more profitable, all else constant. 
Relatively inexpensive transportation enabled farmers to import fertilizers that tremendously 
increased cotton yields per acre. Moreover, the railroad provided a relatively efficient and 
inexpensive method for sending the fertilizer-stimulated surplus to major marketing centers.26 In 
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many areas of Georgia, the expansion of the population and of the railroad network, together, created 
a new problem for farmers - how to use the available productive land more efficiently. With 
animals fenced in, advocates of reform predicted that improved acreage could be expanded. 
Supporters of the policy change saw two sources of unimproved land that could be brought 
into cultivation so as to expand production - the wasted land used as fence rows and the patches of 
fertile ground too small to justify the expenditure for a lawful fence. Contemporaries believed that 
the largest potential efficiency gain from the stock law would be captured by breaking down the 
fences that surrounded their crops and by bringing into cultivation that land that was being used as 
fence rows and the small fertile patches not currently under till. In addition, farmers expected to 
save resources and time when expensive annual fence repairs could be eradicated.27 Nineteenth 
century southern farmers, for the most part, used "worm" fences to enclose their crops, and used pale 
fences for their gardens and homes. Because the worm fence is constructed by laying the ends of the 
rails on top of one another in a zigzag fashion, a length of seven to eight feet of productive land was 
wasted as a fence row.28 Stock law champions spoke of the fence requirement as an additional tax 
upon their land, and a regressive one at that Assume that worm fences spanned seven feet and that 
crops were grown in perfectly square plots of land. Then, since the average amount of tilled acreage 
on Georgia farms was 55.3 (er; 24.2), it is reasonable to argue that, at a minimum, between 1.5 and 
2.4 percent, or 115,354 to 184,567 acres, of the productive land in Georgia was wasted in the form of 
fence rows.29 Of course, this estimate does not represent all of the productive land that could be 
brought into cultivation if the closed range policy were enacted. The calculation ignores all of the 
small fertile patches ofland that were not profitable enough to justify a fence expenditure. Certainly 
there were benefits associated with enclosing animals, but the important question from a social 
income maximization point of view was: would the benefits of fence reform have exceeded the costs 
of changing to a closed range policy? 
The Profitability of Reform 
Using the data in the 1880 Agricultural Census, it is possible to provide an approximation of 
the expected profit or loss that each county in Georgia would have realized if the stock law had been 
instantaneously implemented in 1880. (Specific details of the calculation are given in Appendix A, 
but outlined below.) This theoretical calculation implicitly assumes that farmers immediately 
adjusted to the incentives created by the new law. 
I begin by assuming hypothetically that the stock law was instituted instantaneously 
throughout Georgia. 111 other words, all animals would be enclosed, enabling farmers to remove the 
fences surrounding their crops of cotton and grains. For the calculation, I choose the low estimate of 
wasted acreage of 1.5 percent. For simplicity, I assume that farmers grew two crops with their 
new-found land; cotton would be grown on the previously wasted fence rows of the cotton crops, 
while the wasted land from the com, wheat, rye, and oat fields is assumed to have been planted in 
com, peas, and fodder. 30 Animals in this agricultural society pose somewhat of a problem for the 
calculation because some were already kept in pastures, while others were roaming the open range. 
Therefore, after assigning livestock to available pasturage that existed before the hypothetical 
institutional change, a feed allowance is made for those animals that presumably were previously 
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unenclosed and would afterwards be put behind fences. Since some animal owners were probably 
overinvesting in livestock under the open range policy and the calculation considers all of the 
animals reported by the Census, too much grain will be allocated to feeding the previously 
non-pastured animals. 31 This will bias the profitability estimate downward, and therefore only 
strengthens the final result. Of course, a subtraction is made for the cost of producing the crops, 
including the rent associated with the land used and capital needed to produce the extra crops. 
Finally, the net profit from growing the extra cotton, com, peas, and fodder is the total value of the 
crops produced, minus the cost of feeding the previously non-pastured animals, minus the cost of 
producing the crops. 
In many parts of the state, farmers also would have saved time and resources as fewer fences 
would need to be maintained under a closed range situation. The assumption I make is that after the 
closed range were enacted, farmers would have put their animals into pastures and supplemented 
their diets with other grains. Under this assumption, the average farmer would have found fencing a 
pasture for several animals much cheaper than fencing in his fifty-five acre farm. In regions such as 
the Wiregrass or Pine Barrens where animal husbandry took precedence over farming, "ranchers" 
may have found it more profitable to fence large sections of unimproved land (similar to the Western 
ranges) and to allow the animals to feed themselves in these large open pastures. If this were the 
case, then the estimated net benefits of the policy change for these particular regions will be biased 
downward. Since it is my goal to use assumptions that bias the profitability estimate against being 
positive, I will maintain the assumption that after the institutional change, all Georgia farmers 
pastured their animals and supplemented their diets with grain. 
In order to approximate the savings from maintaining fewer fences, I estimate the value of 
the difference in the depreciation of crop fences before the stock law and of the fences needed to 
enclose the previously non-pastured animals after the stock law. (Note that in largely unimproved 
counties with many animals, a closed range probably required more fencing than was previously 
needed for the protection of the small amount of tilled acreage.) Also taken into account in the 
calculation is the fact that farmers would bear an additional one-time cost of building fences around 
the newly created pasture. Conceivably, they could have moved the fences from around their crops 
to another location and used the old wood to build fences around pastures. However, I assume that 
farmers had to build their animals' fences at the maximum cost of building a new one, $1.90 per 
acre. Again, this assumption will bias the results against finding net benefits. Thus, the final 
profitability measure amounts to the net profit earned from the various crops grown on the new land 
brought into cultivation, plus the depreciation amount saved by maintaining fewer fences, minus the 
cost of building fences for animals previously unenclosed. 
The results of the calculation are presented in Table 1 and represent the net present value of 
the social (un)profitability of the stock law using 1880 data and a discount rate of seven percent. The 
results are broken down to show the weighted average and per capita (dis )savings for the six 
conventional regions of Georgia. The profit measure is also shown as a percentage of the total value 
of farm produce grown within the region in 1880. In order to test the robustness of the estimates, I 
varied several of the key assumptions of the calculation and recomputed the net profitability. The 
results of these sensitivity tests, reported in Table 3.A 1, confirm that the estimates reported in Table 
1 tend to be robust to specification changes. Finally, the results in the Table should be viewed as 
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minimum values. In other words, the net present value calculation does not allow fanners to adjust 
their amount of improved acreage, their crop mix, or the size of their livestock herds over time. 
Those regions expecting to receive a loss from the stock law would adjust quickly to the law and 
certainly would not have realized the full effect of the loss as reported in the Table. Similarly, those 
areas with a positive expected value would actually have had larger "real" savings. 
The results in Table 1 tend to substantiate a priori expectations. The regions with large 
tracts of unimproved land that were used as natural pasture would have been hurt by the imposition 
of the stock law, while areas with relatively more improved acreage would have benefitted. As 
shown in the Table, the unimproved Wiregrass, Pine Barrens, Coastal, and, to a lesser extent, 
Mountain regions expected to lose if property rights to all land were strictly enforced. While the 
average loss for a Pine Barrens, Wiregrass, or Coastal county would have been between $82,000 and 
$101,000, in relative tenns, this loss would have represented approximately thirty to forty percent of 
the value of produce grown in the county in 1880. The average Mountain county expected a loss 
from the closed range of nearly $13,000, or seven percent of the value of its agricultural production. 
The greatest benefits would have accrued to the most improved counties which made up the 
Plantation Belt and Upcountry regions. As Table 1 shows, an average county in the Upcountry could 
have captured about $109,000 in net benefits from the closed range, while Plantation Belt counties 
expected average net benefits on the order of $167 ,000. For Upcountry and Plantation Belt counties, 
the expected net benefits, in relative tenns, were sixteen percent and twenty--0ne percent of the value 
of agricultural production, respectively. For the state as a whole it is interesting to note that the 
expected savings was, on average, $69,474 per county. The net sum of the profits across all counties 
in the state would have amounted to $8,007,500. If we include the expected savings from the 
railroad industry, this eight million dollar savings would have risen by another one million dollars, 
as pointed out above. 
An encouraging result of the profitability calculation presented in Table 1 is the average 
expected savings for those counties that actually had passed the stock law by 1882. 32 This group of
counties, on average, expected to receive about $122,000 more than the state mean. This 
observation lends credence to the Davis and North hypothesis that institutional change tends to come 
about when the net present value of a new institutional arrangement exceeds that of the status quo. 
However, net profitability was not a sufficient condition for the change to take place. Table 2 shows 
the distribution of expected profits and losses broken down by region, with counties that adopted the 
law by 1882 denoted by a star (or dagger, see Table). In the Plantation Belt there were nine counties 
with an expected gain greater than $100,000 that had implemented the stock law, but thirty counties 
with the same magnitude of savings had not yet adopted the law. And in the Upcountry, fifteen 
counties with a profit estimate greater than $100,000 did not follow the lead of two others that had 
adopted the law, but had an expected gain of less than $100,000.33 Why did these forty-five
counties, and those in the same position in the Mountain region, not adopt the relatively profitable 
law? Attributing the failure to transaction costs alone is much too simple, for there is no reason to 
believe that transaction costs were lower in the counties that adopted the stock law than in those that 
did not. In order to find the reason that most of the counties that expected a net gain from the stock 
law failed to adopt it in the early 1880s, it is necessary to explore the rules that governed institutional 
choice. 
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Beginning in 1872 and continuing throughout the late nineteenth century, the Georgia 
legislature manipulated the voting mechanism that determined how the stock law could be 
implemented in the state. Given the nature of the rule changes that narrowed the fence issue to 
smaller and smaller geographic regions, it is important to concentrate on very specific 
politico-geographic areas. Because the data requirements of this endeavor tend to be quite 
extensive, I focus my attention on the two Upcountry counties that have received the most attention 
in the historical literature - Carroll and Jackson counties. As the data in Table 1 and 2 show, 
Carroll's expected savings was near the top of the distribution for the Upcountry, while Jackson's 
expected savings was clearly greater than almost all counties in the Upcountry.34 In terms of net 
profitability relative to the state as a whole, Carroll ranked in the seventh decile, while Jackson 
ranked in the top of the ninth. 
The analysis of the fence law transformation in Carroll and Jackson is not meant to serve as 
a general model for or statement on the state or the South as a whole. Each geographic region 
throughout Georgia, and consequently the South, was unique - with different ratios of improved 
acreage and cotton production, different numbers and kinds of livestock, and diverse racial 
compositions. 35 Carroll and Jackson counties, however, offer a rigorous test of the theory that 
institutional change tends to come about as the relative benefits become positive. Although the 
expected gains were high for these counties, contrary to the theory, they did not adopt the new 
institution right away. What is presented in the remainder of the paper is a microscopic look at the 
dynamics of institutional change. If distributional conflicts and excessive transaction costs prohibit 
society from adopting an income-enhancing institutional change, historically then, how have these 
difficulties been overcome? For the case of two upcountry Georgia counties, this paper emphasizes 
the crucial role that the political process plays as a mechanism to facilitate institutional and 
economic development 
Mechanism Design and Stock Law Implementation 
When animals were free to roam the open range and there was no legal way to force animal 
owners to enclose their livestock, what prevented citizens from voluntarily internalizing the 
externality, as Coase suggests? Since animals owners had a legal right to allow their animals to 
roam the countryside, advocates of the stock law could have compensated, or bribed, their neighbors 
to fence in their stock. In theory, however, this type of negotiated settlement would very rarely 
occur and, if it did, would probably be quite unstable. 
First, it would be difficult for individuals to determine precisely the dollar amount that 
others expected to gain or lose if the closed range policy were enacted. Furthermore, it is clear that 
each person would have an incentive to misrepresent his true expected value - losers would 
overreport their expected losses and winners would underreport their anticipated gains. In order for 
the negotiated "stock law" to operate properly and before anyone growing crops decided to take 
down his fences, all animal owners would have to agree to forgo their common right to the open 
range and to enclose their animals. In this case, each animal owner became a monopolist who could 
hold out until he captured the entire net expected social gain for himself. Certainly, the costs 
associated with achieving the unanimous consent of all residents of a county or a smaller 
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geographical district would skyrocket, quickly becoming greater than any of the benefits that would 
have been realized under the new institution.36 
Even if, say, a small group of farmers were able to negotiate a contract restricting each other 
from using the open range, the stability of such an agreement is questionable. The Georgia Supreme 
Court did recognize these Coase type agreements between neighbors. In Winters v. Jacobs the Court 
affirmed that "If adjacent owners agree to dispense with the partition fence and to inclose their land 
in common, it is the same as if they are jointly bound to maintain a division fence. The agreement is 
the fence, and each of the parties is bound at his peril to keep his cattle on his own land. "37 These 
gentlemanly accords, however, could easily sour if one party became lax in his commitment to abide 
by the contract's terms. The bitter dispute between neighbors George H. Tumlin and Charles C. 
Parrott of Bartow county became the source of the Georgia high court's deliberations. Allegedly, 
Tumlin "wilfully, recklessly and unnecessarily [shot] and kill[ed] three [of Parrott's] cattle" with a 
Winchester rifle. Witnesses at Tumlin's trial testified that the two neighbors "had made an 
agreement not to have any dividing fence as they were scarce of timber, and that neither one of them 
was to pasture their lands adjoining each other." And there was no dispute that the surrounding 
fence for the two plantations was legal. 38 
The problem arose when Parrott's cattle strayed onto Tumlin's land, eating the latter's crops. 
Tumlin frequently had to drive the cattle back over to their home, requesting Parrott and his workers 
to keep the animals offhis -Tumlin's - property. Soon, the cattle were back eating Tumlin's crops, 
so he shot the animals, killing $24 0 worth of livestock and maiming another $30 worth. Tumlin did 
not recompense his neighbor. Parrott sued for treble damages, as allowed by law, arguing that his 
neighbor did not try to drive the cattle back home and that Tumlin's land was not enclosed by a legal 
fence.39 In the end, Tumlin lost his case. The Court decided that in order to kill animals without 
responsibility, an actual legal fence had to be broken, not merely the agreement to dispense with it 40 
Of course, there probably were harmonious agreements between two, and possibly more, 
neighbors that enabled them to capture some of the efficiency gains associated with enclosing 
livestock. However, as George Tumlin learned, even neighbors could not be completely trusted to 
abide by a simple agreement to remove a dividing fence and to keep animals under control. The last 
resort for men in Tumlin 's position certainly was not to kill the trespassing animals, it was to enclose 
their improved acreage - in total. Robert Frost was indeed correct- "'good fences make good 
neighbors. "'41 The seriousness of the fence law, reinforced by decisions of the Georgia Supreme 
Court, forced farmers to think twice about growing crops without the protection of a tangible fence, 
on all sides. 
In 1872 the Georgia General Assembly eased the burden of fence law refmmers by allowing 
individual counties to decide whether to fence crops or livestock. Whereas before 1872 a single 
animal owner anywhere in Georgia could, theoretically at least, force every farmer to erect fences to 
keep his animals out, after 1872 it took a majority of voters who turned out at an election within a 
county to do so. To bring about a fence election, fifty freeholders were required to file a petition 
with the county's ordinary (county chief executive), whose job it was to advertise their desire for an 
election. The movement could be quashed, however, if fifty additional freeholders presented the 
ordinary with a counter-petition to call off the impending election. If, after the filing of the 
counter-petition, twenty-five more landowners added their names to the original petition, the 
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ordinary was forced to hold an election on the first Monday in July. The 1872 act decreed that a 
county could not have more than one fence election per two year period.42 While only freeholders 
could call for or call off an election, the important feature of this legislation was that all eligible 
voters were permitted to vote in the referendum.43 
The 1872 legislation was a major victory for stock law supporters in Georgia. As Table 1 
demonstrates, the costs and benefits were dramatically different across the state, making a statewide 
stock law politically unattainable. At their 1878 spring meeting in Americus, Georgia, "A Member" 
of the Georgia State Agricultural Society acknowledged that," ... there are some parts of Georgia 
where the [stock] law would work very well. Again, there are other parts of Georgia where, I am 
convinced, it [stock law] would work injuriously."44 J.T. Henderson, the Commissioner of 
Agriculture, in his 1881 report confirmed that "It is not expected that the stock law will be adopted in 
the wire-grass counties of the State, where the larger area is in [open range] pasture. In that section 
of the State and in some of the counties of North Georgia the proposed law would be as great a 
hardship as the old law, requiring crops to be fenced, is in farming and planting sections."45 Fence 
reformers realized that a statewide stock law, such as the one hypothetically assumed in the last 
section, would be difficult legislation to push through the General Assembly. Henderson concluded, 
"The interests and industries of different sections of the State are too varied to admit of a general law 
applicable to all sections."46 The commissioner's predecessor, Thomas P. Janes, concurred, "This 
law [county option] is a wise one, and perhaps as much as can be reasonably demanded by the 
advocates of a no fence law. Georgia is a large state, and the circumstances differ greatly in the 
several sections of the State .... Any law on this subject, involving a material change in the system 
of fencing, should be submitted to a vote of the people of each county for adoption or rejection. "47 
In Georgia at least, the fence's fate was to be determined by direct local democracy.48 
The act "relating to fences and stock, and for the protection of crops," as it was officially 
called, was quite resistent to change throughout the 1870s. The General Assembly, on the whole, 
agreed with the more moderate stock law supporters that enclosing animals was a necessary step 
toward agricultural prosperity. But the decision to fence or not had to be settled at the local level­
the legislature was not yet prepared to preempt "a vote of the people." Efforts to repeal a county's 
right to change its fence laws were futile. An 1873 Senate bill to repeal the act relating to fences and 
stock was returned from the Committee on Agriculture with an adverse recommendation. Given that 
the committee was dominated (4- 3) by Plantation Belt senators whose counties, according to the 
previously reported estimates for 1880, expected to profit from the stock law, it is not surprising that 
the bill was quashed in committee.49 An 1875 attempt at repeal in the House faced the same fate.50 
While political sentiment throughout the 1870s leaned toward refonn, implementation at the county 
level was far from spirited. By 1882 only 8.8 percent (12 of 137) of all Georgia counties had 
voluntarily adopted the stock law and two counties had the law imposed on them by the state 
legislature. Of those counties that expected a net benefit in 1880, only 15.9 percent (14 of 88) had 
the stock law by 1882, ten years after the legislature allowed a vote on the issue. The main question, 
however, is what prevented the other counties whose adoption would have been profitable from 
following the same course of action? A close examination of the data from Carroll and Jackson 
counties, which are both about forty miles upcountry of Atlanta, will reveal that while the stock law 
may have been income-enhancing from a social point of view, the median voter was against fence 
12 
reform. The ultimate reason for the stock law's defeat at the county level can be traced to the 
mechanism that governed institutional choice. 
To see why the 1872 law, generally, was an inadequate mechanism for promoting the 
adoption of the closed range, it is best to identify how various coalitions sided on the fence debate. 
In order to distinguish the bases of support for the stock law. the natural way to divide the 
agricultural communities of Carroll and Jackson is into six coalitions - landowners (expected 
winners and losers from the stock law), tenants (winners and losers), wage laborers, and 
townspeople. With the 100 percent matched sample of the manuscript agricultural and population 
schedules of the 1880 census that I have compiled, I am able to determine precisely the sizes of the 
six coalitions defined above. In particular, since I have very detailed information on individual 
farms, I am able to perform the same calculation as detailed in Appendix A so as to determine which 
owner-operated or tenant farms expected a net loss or benefit if the closed range were instituted in 
1880. The results of the calculation for Carroll and Jackson farms are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
The tables show the sizes and average expected benefits or losses for the various farm coalitions, as 
well as summary statistics describing the farms in each coalition. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the results, it is important to discuss a problem that 
arises in the calculation of the net benefits for individual farms. When the individual expected 
benefits and losses are summed across all farms within a county, the sum turns out to be much less
than the savings estimate obtained using the county's aggregated data, as reported in Table 1 - i.e., 
N N 
f CL,x;) > Lf 1 (x, ), where x1 represents the vector of data for farm i and f is the expected savings 
i=l i=l 
function. The discrepancy arises because some farmers were already putting their animals in fenced 
pastures, even while the open range policy was still in force. According to my estimates which are 
based on contemporary agricultural practices (see Appendix A, section 5 ), most of these farmers 
provided their animals with more pasture than they actually needed. The "excess" pasture amounts 
to 3726 acres in Carroll and 35 13 acres in Jackson. In the countywide calculations described above 
and presented in Table 1, the "excess" pasture is hypothetically consumed by others because it is as 
if a "social planner" allocated other farmers' animals to the extra pasture land. However, when I 
calculate the individual farmer's net benefit, I have to assume that the excess pasture is wasted 
because the user (if anyone) of the abundant land cannot be identified because of the data's 
limitations. If farmers, who had no pasture of their own, were renting the excess pasturage, then this 
might result in an overestimate of the number of expected losers and the value of their losses. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to infer rental patterns from the census data. Thus, the results 
reported in Tables 3 and 4 are based on the individual level data as reported in the census imd I 
maintain the somewhat unrealistic assumption that the excess pasture is wasted. 
What is immediately apparent from the results in Tables 3 and 4 is that the stock law would 
have been most profitable for those farmers already pasturing their animals before the hypothetical 
institutional change. Landowners in Carroll who expected a net gain used eight acres of pasture, 
while their losing counterparts had, on average, on! y one-tenth of an acre in pasture. A similar 
observation holds for Carroll's tenants. Tenants who would have profitted from the stock law 
received from their landlords about one and a half acres of pasture, while their counterparts 
expecting a loss were allocated virtually no pasture space. If farmers were already enclosing their 
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animals in pastures, then they were receiving no benefits from the open range. In fact, the fence law 
imposed a cost on these farmers by forcing them to fence in the tilled areas of their farms. If these 
farmers were legally permitted to take down their fences, they would have realized a savings in the 
form of expanded acreage and diminished annual fence repairs. 
Even if a farmer had no pasture, he still might have been able to benefit from a closing of the 
range. If he were cultivating a piece of land and had very few animals, then it is quite plausible that 
the savings the farmer would have received from expanding his acreage and lowering his fencing 
costs would have exceed the costs of building a pasture for his few animals and feeding them 
homegrown or purchased grain. This point is made in the comparison of livestock holdings between 
expected winners and losers. Expected beneficiaries (comparing landowners and tenants separately) 
always have fewer animals, on average, than expected losers. Thus, there seem to be two important 
forces that determined a farmer's monetary interest in the closed range - whether he was already 
pasturing his livestock and the size of his herd. 
Some historians of the fence debate in the postbellum South argue that coalitions split along 
very well-defined lines. Laborers and tenants of both races, along with "very small farmers, the 
poorer end of the landowning class," formed a coalition against reform, while richer white 
landowners pushed for fence reform.51 Or, as Steven Hahn puts it, "the mass of Upcountry yeomen, 
tenants, and laborers" fought against "landlords, merchants, and business interests throughout the 
state. "52 However, if the data in Tables 3 and 4 offer some indication as to how individuals sided in 
the conflict, these historians' claims are somewhat clouded. On the surface, it seems likely that 
small, relatively poor landowners who relied on the open range to feed their animals would have 
been solidly against any redefinition of property rights to the unenclosed land around them. 
Conversely, wealthier landowners who could afford to provide pasturage for their animals and who 
expected to profit from enclosure were probably the champions of reform. However, as argued 
above, farm size alone did not determine how a farmer would fare if the laws governing unfenced 
land were changed. No doubt some small farmers had very few animals and stood to gain from 
enclosing livestock, while some very large landowners had little or no pasture lands along with a 
large herd size. It is interesting to note that of Carroll's 4 38 landowners (hypothetically) expecting a 
net gain from the closed range policy, 25 3 had less than 4 5  tilled acres, 178 of the 4 38 had less than 
35 acres, and 82 had less than 25 acres. Similarly, of the 378 winning landowners in Jackson, 139 
had less than 4 5  acres in production, 87 of 378 had less than 35 acres, and 4 0  had less than 25 acres. 
Moreover, there were many relatively large farms that stood to lose if the closed range were 
imposed. Of the 983 losing landowners in Carroll, 190 had over 60 acres under till, 136 had more 
than 70 acres, and 35 had more than 100 acres. Of the 75 1 landowners in fackson predicted to lose, 
86 had more than 100 acres in production. Thus, contrary to Hahn's claims, it is not clear that "very 
small farmers" or yeomen and relatively wealthy landowners (in terms of farm size) would have split 
so easily against or in favor of fence reform. The forces that determined a farmer's financial interest 
in the matter, as shown above, are more complicated than a simple "haves" versus "have nots" model 
would suggest 
Given the profitability estimates presented in Tables 3 and 4 ,  tenants as a class cannot be so 
easily placed in the fence law camp. Certainly there was a quality distribution of tenants, the better 
ones presumably receiving a higher renumeration for their services. Not only was the "good" tenant 
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rewarded because he was more productive, but also because it was in the landowner's interest to 
retain a high quality tenant who gave more careful attention to the owner's land and livestock. In 
other words, good tenants may have been able to collect rents because of their scarce, and highly 
desirable, position among landless laborers. One way to compensate high quality tenants may have 
been to provide them with pasture on the landowner's farm. Pasture, of course, meant that the tenant 
did not have to turn his animals out into the forest to nourish themselves. Enclosing animals not 
only saved valuable time that could be spent on the farm, but it also corresponded to higher quality 
meat and dairy products because the animals' food intake could be controlled. According to the 
manuscript agricultural schedules, 4 0  tenants were able to secure pasture land in Carroll and 46 were 
able to do the same in Jackson. Although these tenants had pasture, they still had the option to let 
some of their animals roam the countryside. According to contemporary evidence (see section 5 ,  
Appendix A) and the data in Tables 3 and 4 ,  these tenants were given enough pasture to enclose all 
of their livestock. 
From the tenant's point of view, pasture was an item that the landowner and tenant had to 
negotiate. In the rental contract between James Willbanks and C.M. Wood, a landlord from 
Harmony Grove, Jackson county, for example, the subject of pasturage was made quite explicit. Not 
only was Willbanks "to take care of said farm as it was his own," but it was stated also that "there is 
to be noe pastureing on the land of said place that are in cultivation." [sic ]53 If the rental contract 
forbade pasturing on cultivated acreage, and provided no formal pasture or unimproved land for 
animals to forage54, a tenant then had three options: he could keep no animals, as 6.1 percent of 
Carroll and Jackson tenants decided; he could pen his animals and feed them purchased grain or 
fodder grown on his small farm or, similarly, he could rent a plot of pasture; or he could send his 
livestock out into the forest to find food for themselves. Presumably, most poor tenants chose the 
latter alternative, but would they all have been hurt by the stock law? As the results underlying 
Tables 3 and 4 indicate, there were very many tenants who would have benefitted from the stock 
law, even though they had no pasture. Because so many tenants had so few animals to begin with, 
the benefits associated with expanding acreage and eliminating large-scale fence maintenance would 
have exceeded the costs of enclosing and feeding them. In total, about forty-seven percent of the 
tenants in Carroll and thirty percent in Jackson stood to gain from fencing animals in, instead of 
fencing them out. 
For those tenants expecting a loss from the stock law, the financial injury would have been 
somewhat tempered by the competitive mai:ket for labor.55 We can think of the tenant's wage as 
being composed of two parts. There was an explicit contract with the landlord that determined how 
much land the tenant could use, how much of the crop he could keep, or, how much rent he would 
have to pay (depending on the type of contract), and, for example, how much pasture he was 
permitted. The tenant's total real wage also included an implicit value attached to the option of 
letting his animals run the countryside. If the latter component were eliminated, then the tenant's 
real wage would clearly decrease. But the tenant could always move to a county where the open 
range was still in force. Therefore, if the county that decided to close its range was "small" relative 
to the surrounding area that retained the open range and tenants could move costlessly, then 
landowners who wished to adopt the stock law would have to compensate their tenants fully for the 
losses associated with inaccesibility to the open range.56 This scenario is one in which the supply of 
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labor is completely elastic. If there were some elasticity in supply, however, losing tenants would 
not have been completely compensated and they still would have expected a net loss from the 
institutional change. 
Since there were some costs of moving, it is unlikely that losing tenants would have been 
compensated enough to make them completely indifferent between the two institutions. But the 
power of the competitive market was certainly discussed in the contemporary debate. Jackson 
county's "Progress", for example, contended that the stock law would make both landowners and 
their tenants better off. "The income of tenants and wages of hirelings will be regulated by the 
profits of the land owners . . . . Renters now demand houses for their families, and why not demand, 
under the new law, pasturage for their stock with the same propriety? This they will do and receive 
it at far less cost to the owner than is required to repair fences." Similarly, the Jefferson Forest News 
editorialized: 
It is currently reported that the great majority of the colored people in this county are 
opposed to it [stock law] upon the idea that most of them are tenants, and that if the stock 
law is passed they cannot keep any stock on their own account. .. .It is pure fallacy to say 
that the laborer or tenant, or, as the demagogues have it, the poor man, will suffer by it. 
The man who will have the burden to bear will be the man who owns the land. He will 
be compelled to furnish pasturage for his tenants or not get them, and it is impossible for 
him to do without help. 
Richard Baldwin, a black Morgan county resident, speaking in Monroe, Walton county, admitted 
that he had been opposed to the stock law at first, but upon seeing how the stock law operated in his 
home county, soon changed his mind and averred that all other blacks had also. Baldwin affirmed 
that "I know of no man in Morgan county who charges his tenants for pastures. If there was such a 
man the darkeys wouldn't live with him to save his life." "Tenant" had the same faith in the stock 
law, believing it to be in " . . .  the interest of the tenant fully as much or more than the land-holder, 
from the fact that whoever furnishes the best pastures will certainly get the best tenants, as it is all 
bosh about the land-holder being more independent than the tenant, for what is his land wonh to him 
without labor?" In Rockdale county, which was one of the first to pass the stock law, the editor of 
the county newspaper observed that "landlords see who can arrange the best pastures to secure the 
best tenants."57 Thus, not only do the expected benefit estimates mar Hahn's suggestion that tenants 
were unanimously in favor of the status quo, so do the predictions of economic theory and the 
statements of contemporaries about the competitive market. 
Arguing that wage laborers, as a group, whole-heartedly supported the fence law may also 
be uncertain. There is a trace (quite literally) of evidence from the manuscript agricultural schedules 
that wage laborers kept animals, although they had no land for them.58 Having taken advantage of 
the open range situation, these laborers would certainly experience a decrease in income if a stock 
law were imposed. Specifically, they would either have to rent the necessary pasture and purchase 
feed or sell the animals. Alternatively, there were laborers who had no animals and, thus, were 
probably indifferent between the two laws, at least in the short run. If these individuals expected to 
own a cow or pig one day, then their interests would lean toward the status quo. However, the 
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competitive martcet for wage laborers would have offered some compensation for those who 
expected a decrease in income from the stock law. Because the data on livestock holding for 
laborers is very incomplete, it is difficult to predict accurately how they should have fared under a 
closed range situation. For the 5 24 farm laborers in Carroll and the 1499 in Jackson, a theoretical 
prediction as to how they sided on the fence question would be tenuous. In the empirical analysis of 
the voting returns presented in the next section, I will be able to determine more precisely how this 
pivotal coalition aligned. 
There is one final coalition of likely beneficiaries of the new institution that must be 
considered, townspeople. Keeping small gardens and very few animals, town residents had an 
incentive to keep animals, usually swine, from roaming through their relatively densely populated 
hamlets. The General Assembly, in fact, gave many incorporating towns' mayors and aldermen the 
right to pass local ordinances forbidding animals from running at large.59 The town of Carrollton, 
the county seat of Carroll, passed its own local ordinance in March, 1886, making it unlawful for 
animals allowed "willfully and negligently" to run at large within the corporate limits of the town.60 
As town populations grew with increased industrial activity in the postbellum era, the costs of 
maintaining the open range (health costs, for example) grew rapidly, creating an incentive to rectify 
the problem through legislation. The town coalition, however, was quite small, amounting to only 
381 (household heads) in Carroll and 206 in Jackson. For the most part, it seems reasonable to 
hypothesize that the small coalition of town voters would have advocated fence reform, along with 
landowners and tenants who expected to profit from enclosing livestock. 
A glance at the data in Tables 3 and 4 suggests that the coalition of beneficiaries -
landowners, tenants, and townspeople - was clearly outnumbered by the losing coalition of 
landowners and tenants. In Carroll, for example, the expected beneficiaries numbered 125 0, 
including 438 landowners, 431 tenants, and 381 townspeople. The expected losers numbered 983 
landowners and 479 tenants. In Jackson there were 688 total expected beneficiaries, including 378 
landowners, 104 tenants, and 206 townspeople. These 688 net winners were clearly outnumbered by 
75 1 landowners and 240 tenants who expected to lose if the new institution had been imposed. It is 
doubtful that laborers in either county would have voted for the stock law with such intensity so as to 
produce a victory. In fact, each time Carroll and Jackson voters went to the polls, stock law 
supporters were never able to garner more than twenty-seven to thirty-eight percent of the total 
votes cast 61 The median voter was clearly in favor of the status quo. The only chance that the 
minority coalition had was to bribe, or compensate, those individuals who expected a utility loss 
from the proposed law. In theory, bribing might have offered a solution to the problem. 
Realistically though, negotiating for the votes of approximately 1,000 people was probably close to 
impossible. 
The nature of the relationship between relatively wealthy landowners and their tenants and 
wage laborers could have made transfer payments flow easily. Because landowners and laborers 
were periodically bargaining with one another to determine the rent or wage, a contingency clause 
could have been included in the contract, providing the tenant or laborer with the appropriately sized 
sidepayment to compensate for any expected loss. There are three basic problems with arguing that 
this type of negotiated settlement would emerge. First, the bargaining was likely to become very 
expensive. The time needed for both laborer and landowner to determine the appropriate amount of 
17  
compensation and then to agree on it could easily outweigh any of the benefits associated with the 
institutional change. Second, there is the issue of whether or not this type of contractual agreement 
was credible. Many laborers, no doubt, would have questioned the sincerity of their employer's 
willingness to pay for their votes after the election was already won. Finally, the problem that would 
have caused the most damage to a settlement was free riding. Assume that all members of the 
bribing coalition agreed that each one would "purchase" the votes of his own laborers. Without a 
mechanism to enforce this pact, each member had an incentive to free ride, enjoying the full benefits 
of the institutional change without paying his share of the cost. Given that there was no mechanism 
to keep landowners from defecting, it is not surprising that many counties that could have profited 
from the stock law, failed to achieve the change. As long as the median voter was against change 
and sidepayments could not be effected, the status quo, no matter how socially inefficient, would 
persevere. 
There were two obvious solutions to this problem - either voters who had the most to lose 
by the institutional change could be disfranchised, thereby shifting the median voter toward being a 
net winner, or a formal mechanism could be created that would eliminate free riding and put the 
force of law behind the ftow of sidepayments. Stock law supporters were able to identify those 
voters who, in their opinion, blocked the institutional change. "The non land owning class have no 
right to vote on this subject [fence question]," argued one Carroll county reformer. Another asserted 
that "there should be a property qualification to every vote cast - own so much property to be 
allowed to vote . . . . It does seem sensible, dont you think, to allow the landholders to say whether 
they shall fence their lands or not."62 According to this plan, landless tenants and laborers, who 
comprised a large majority of the opposition, could be excluded from voting. Thomas P. Janes, the 
Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture, in his 1875 annual report made clear his position on the fence 
question: 
Even the present Act, which leaves the question of "fencing stock" or "fencing crops" to 
the voters of the several counties is unjust, since it allows non-freeholders, who generally 
consist a majority of the voters of every county, to decide a question of policy and 
economy in which they have no interest. The most equitable way of disposing of the 
question which, under the present labor system, is a vital one, is by legislative enactment 
leaving its decision to the freeholders of each county.63 
Surely, non-freeholders had an "interest" in the matter. It was just the wrong one, from the 
reformers' perspective. Fence supporters blasted t.'Je call for disfum.chisement, saying that "such 
sentiments as these are tyranical and we are opposed to them from the fact that we live in an 
independent government by the people. "64 And the legislature agreed, no special restrictions were 
ever enacted that eliminated the franchise of specific coalitions of stock law opponents or 
supporters.65 
If disfranchisement was not an option, it was possible to manipulate the rules that governed 
choice in an attempt to create an advantage for the reform movement. In 1881 the Georgia General 
Assembly dramatically changed the rules offence elections. Whereas the 1872 act only allowed 
county voters to decide on the issue once biennially, an 1881 amendment completely removed this 
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restriction. Now, the ordinary, after the petition sequence, could call for an election at any time, 
instead of requiring it to be held on the first Monday in July.66 Henceforth, that official could set the 
election date, for instance, during harvest time, when most small farmers, tenants, and laborers were 
busy with their work. In addition, a county could now hold elections again and again, inevitably 
dampening turnout, which reduced the number of votes that stock law advocates had to win. This 
advantage only lasted for two years though, when in 1883 the legislature restricted a county's vote to 
once per year, the first Wednesday in July.67 
The most significant legislative change in 1881 permitted referenda on the fence issue at the 
sub-county militia district level. Similar in spirit to the 1872 act, the militia district law required 
fifteen freeholders or a majority of the freeholders to file a petition calling for a district election with 
the county ordinary. After advertising it in a local newspaper for twenty days, the ordinary was 
required to hold an election as early as possible, although no more than one election could be held in 
a district every twelve months. There was no counter-petition option provided in this act. 68 The 
wording of the ballots also was changed for the district elections. Instead of voting for "no fence" 
(stock law) or "fence" (status quo) as it was in a countywide referendum, the district election 
required the ballots to read either "stock law" or "for fence." Although this may appear to be a subtle 
nuance, its significance will be discussed later. Once a district passed the stock law, it would go into 
effect six months after the election, and it was the district's responsibility to erect "good and 
substantial" fences around its circumference in order to prevent strays from other places from 
entering into the closed range area. 69 This requirement, at the time, made the cost of adopting the 
stock law quite high, but it was struck down by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1885 . The Court said 
later in an 1888 case that "The erection of a fence is simply a means for the better carrying out of the 
law, and not a necessary condition to its going into effect." 70 
The most remarkable feature of the 1881 legislation was that it required the owners or 
proprietors of land in militia districts that adopted the stock law to provide pasturage for at least one 
cow and calf for the family of each tenant. This provision came into force if the tenant did his 
proportionate share of the fencing of the pasture. Indeed, this pasture requirement, which did not 
pertain to countywide elections, acted as a contingency contract, promising to compensate, at least 
partially, tenants for their losses after the stock law was adopted. According to contemporary 
estimates (see Appendix A, section 5 ), one acre would have been sufficient to pasture a cow and a 
calf. Given this assumption, the profitability estimates can be recomputed to see if any significant 
changes would have occured. If a tenant already had pasture before the institutional change, his 
estimate would remain the same. However, for tenants who reported no pasture in the 1880 census, I 
added one acre of pasture to their data and reran the calculation, leaving everything else constant. 
The results are rather significant. For Carroll county, whereas 4 7.4 percent of the tenants expected a 
non-negative net benefit from the stock law even though there was no the pasture allowance, 80.0 
percent would have benefitted if the landowner was required to provide an acre of pasture. In 
Jackson county, the results show the same steep trend, rising from 30.2 percent if no pasture was 
provided to 71 .4 percent with a pasture allotrnent.71 
The 1881 law allowing district referenda on the fence problem, in effect, made the 
bargaining between landowners and tenants almost trivial. The pasture sidepayment to tenants that 
was required by law would have made the law profitable for an additional thirty-two percent of the 
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tenants in Carroll and an additional forty-<me percent in Jackson. Since the law required all 
landowners hiring tenants to make the transfer payment, free riding off of the bribes of others was 
impossible. Not only was the possibility of defecting from the cooperative solution eliminated, but 
the 1881 law also made the compensation scheme a reality. 
The 1872 law, along with the 1881 amendments, vastly reduced the power of holdouts 
against the stock law. Before 1872, a single owner of animals could force every fanner to erect 
fences to keep his animals out. After 1872, it took a majority in a county. After 1 881,  a majority in 
a militia district, a much smaller unit, could, in effect, compel neighboring fanners, as well as fence 
law supporters within the district, to enclose their stock. At the county level and then the district 
level, fence law advocates had to win every time; whereas, stock law men had to carry only a single 
contest. In 1896 the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that once passed, the stock law was irrevocable. 
" [T]he plain meaning of all the legislative declarations upon the subject," the Court declared, "is, 
that 'no fence' or the 'stock law,' when once established, shall be permanent and not thereafter 
subject to change."72 The legislature's actions, consistently buttressed by favorable judicial rulings, 
had biased the rules in favor of refonn. 
An Empirical Look 
The hypothesis advanced in the previous section is that Georgia counties that expected a 
positive benefit from the stock law were unable to adopt it because the rules governing choice made 
the cooperative solution, which depended on transfer payments, virtually impossible to achieve. In 
other words, there was no mechanism to reduce the transactions costs associated with voluntarily 
bargaining to adopt the more efficient institution. In most cases, the 1 872 law did not produce the 
results that policy makers had probably hoped for - that is, the implementation of the closed range 
where it would be most profitable. However, the 1881 legislation allowing for militia district 
referenda changed the rules of the game, creating an opportunity for a landowner/tenant/town 
coalition to adopt the new institution. This section tests empirically whether the legislature's 
manipulation of the voting mechanism influenced the outcome. 
After three frustrating defeats at the countywide level in Carroll and two in Jackson, stock 
law supporters began to concentrate their attention on adopting the law at the militia district level. 
By July 1887, eight of the fifteen districts in Carroll had adopted the stock law in district referenda. 
In four of these eight districts, however, the fence law had originally been declared the victor, but 
after being contested on the ground of ballot fraud, the county ordinary overturned the results and 
declared the districts stock law areas. The precise wording of the law, no doubt, created confusion 
among voters as the county election ballots were required to read either "fence" or "no fence," the 
latter meaning the stock law. However, as stated previously, the district election ballots had to be 
either "for fence" or for the "stock law." The election in Carroll's Bowdon district was particularly 
"muddled" as the precinct managers certified the result in favor of the fence law 102 to 73. 
However, the actual vote cast was 73 for "stock law," 68 "for fence," 30 for "fence," 2 for "a fence," 
and 2 for "the fence." The county ordinary, after hearing arguments from both sides, threw out the 
34 votes not cast "for fence," thus leaving a majority of 73 to 68 for the "stock law. "73 And in the 
remaining four districts that adopted the stock law through legal balloting, the law won with very 
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slight majorities. Therefore, by taking advantage of legal ambiguities and by concentrating their 
attention on the much smaller districts, stock law supporters were able to close the open range of 
Carroll and Jackson counties little by little. 
As individual districts forced the enclosure of their own animals, they increased the cost to 
neighboring communities of maintaining the open range. When a district passed the stock law, it 
meant that neither indigenous nor foreign animals were permitted to roam freely within its borders. 
Therefore, another coalition of supporters emerged as neighboring areas opted for the institutional 
change. A person living in an open range district, but next to a stock law district or county was 
doubly burdened by the fence law in his own community. Not only did the "liner," as they called 
themselves, have to fence in his own farm from neighbors' roving animals, but he also had to 
enclose his own livestock so that they would not stray into an adjacent stock law area. I.H.P. Beck, a 
stock law supporter, understood the consequences of keeping the fence law in the midst of reform: 
"If Bowdon district gets the stock law, what are we poor fellows in Shiloh to do, situated as we will 
be between two districts that have adopted it. I reckon we will have to 'huddle up' in the middle of 
the district." In fact, as the date of Shiloh's district election approached, Beck conjectured: "It 
seems to me that if liners would vote for their interest success would be inevitable. "74 Voters in 
Shiloh rejected the arguments and maintained the status quo, 47 to 27.75 
While voter confusion and "cross--0ver" effects may explain some of the transition to the 
stock law, to what extent did the pasture requirement of the 1881 law offer sufficient compensation 
to convert would-be losers into stock law voters? To answer this question, I will analyze the 
aggregate voting behavior of individual districts within Carroll and Jackson counties. From 1881 to 
1 890, Carroll county held five countywide fence elections - in January, 1882; September, 1882; 
July, 1885; July, 1887; and July, 1 890. Jackson county held two countywide elections, one in July, 
1881,  and another in September, 1883. In addition, many of the militia districts held local--0ption 
elections, which were sporadically and incompletely reported in the newspapers. I was, however, 
able to collect the election returns from fourteen of these district elections. As mentioned above, the 
county ordinary overturned the results of many district elections. Therefore, in the data analysis, I 
use the figures that were reported by the precinct managers and not the results that emerged from 
litigation. The vote reported out of the district represents the "true" sentiment of the voters; by using 
the final result determined by the ordinary, I would be misrepresenting the actual intention of the 
voters. 
Two sets of hypotheses will be tested: ( !) In countywide elections, various coalitions voted 
for the option (stock law or status quo) that promised to maximize their net returns. In other words, 
did landowners and tenants who, if my assumptions are accurate, would have expected a 
non-negative profit from the stock law actually translate this belief into votes for the new 
institution? Alternatively, did those farmers who anticipated a loss. support the open range with 
vigor? Did town dwellers vote for the closed range as might be predicted? Finally, which 
alternative did wage laborers support? (2) The second hypothesis is that the 1881 rule changes 
governing district elections offered enough incentive to "buy" the votes of tenants who previously 
had no pasture and would have, under the pre-1881 structure, expected a net loss from the closed 
range policy. 
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The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is voting behavior. Exactly how this will 
be operationalized is discussed below. The independent variables for the test are the percentages of 
the population (of household heads) that fall into one of seven coalitions - winning landowners 
(WL), losing landowners (LL), winning tenants (WT), losing tenants (LT), townspeople (TOWN), 
rural laborers (LABOR), and other workers (OTH) not living in towns or working in agriculture 
(e.g., blacksmiths or artisans). With my 100 percent matched sample of the population and 
agricultural schedules of Carroll and Jackson, I am able to determine precisely the values of the 
independent variables for each district in the two counties. The final independent variable used is 
the percentage of the eligible electorate not voting (ABSTAIN). When an individual district adopted 
the stock law, this did not prohibit it from voting in forthcoming countywide elections. As Kousser 
and I show in "Common Sense or Commonwealth," once a district adopted the stock law, its voters 
subsequently abstained in great numbers.76 Therefore, in the regressions that follow, ABSTAIN is 
included as an independent variable so as to hold turnout constant 
A minimum logit chi-squared model is used for the econometric estimation of voting 
behavior. The derivation of the model is detailed in Appendix B .  The basic equation being 
estimated, however, is: 
[ pSTK(ir) ] log 1 - PsrK(it) = a +  J3X,, + e,, , 
where PsrKc••> is the percentage of the ballots cast for the stock law in district i at election time t, x,, 
is the matrix of independent variables, and e,, is a randomly distributed error term. Since, by 
construction, the error term is heteroskedastic, the estimation must include a correction for this 
problem. The correction is done by multiplying both sides of the above equation by the square root 
of N, the number of eligible voters. 
The first goal is to determine how the various coalitions voted during the countywide 
elections. The results reported in column (I) of Table 5 are based on a cross-section time-series
regression of all districts in the two counties for all seven countywide elections that took place. The 
numbers in column ( l) show how a change of one standard deviation from the mean of the particular 
variable (holding all else corlstant) affected the probability of voting for the stock law. The data for 
this estimation includes onljlthe countywide elections and none of the local--0ption district elections. 
Note that the estimated probability of voting for the stock law when all variables are set at their 
means is 0.248. 
The hypothesis that voters clashed according to material self-interest is very much 
supported by the data. As the results in column (1) indicate, an increase (by one standard deviation) 
in the percentage oflandowners who expected a loss from the stock law meant that the stock law 
would lose four percentage points. The proposed law's support was bolstered by 6.4 points when 
there were relatively more tenants who expected a net gain and by 8. 7 percent when there was a 
higher proportion of the voters living in towns. These three results are statistically significant at 
conventional levels (SS% level). Unfortunately, the coefficients for landowning winners and tenant 
losers were not significantly different from zero in the regression. Moreover, the data confirm that 
laborers were solidly against the stock law in countywide referenda. Increasing the share of laborers 
in a district by one standard deviation decreased the stock law's vote by eleven percentage points. 
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Finally, higher voter abstention corresponded to greater relative support for the institutional change. 
As mentioned above, once districts adopted the stock law, voters began to abstain in large numbers. 
When the closed range was voted in, the decision was final, and there really was no reason to vote in 
a countywide election. Kousser and I show that instead of imposing their views on districts that 
retained the open range, fence law and stock law partisans followed a strategy of "allegiance to local 
control." That is, they decided to leave the fence question to those who had a direct interest in the 
matter. The regression results show that this decreased political activity was stronger among fence 
law partisans. An increase in the percent of the electorate abstaining corresponded to a significant 
increase (4.8) in the percent voting for the stock law. Thus, the data refute the historians' hypothesis 
that poor landowners, tenants, and laborers were uniformly against the stock law policy. Instead, as 
the profitability estimates predicted and as the voting analysis now confirms, there was a group of 
tenants who united with their landowners and their town neighbors in an attempt to capture the 
efficiency gains associated with a closed range. 
The next objective is to determine how the changing rules that governed choice affected 
voting behavior. If the theory presented in the previous section is accurate, then many tenants 
expecting a loss should have voted for the stock law in district elections, as they they would have 
received about an acre of pasture if the law were passed. In order to capture the effects of the rule 
change, I pool the countywide and districtwide voting returns. Because not all districts held 
elections and because some districts' elections returns were not recorded in the county newspapers, 
the number of observations in the analysis drops substantially. Since the goal is to distinguish the 
voting behavior of specific coalitions under both voting regimes, the only way to obtain unbiased 
estimates of the behavioral change is to analyze districts for which countywide and districtwide 
election data exist. Since only thirteen of twenty-nine districts in Carroll and Jackson are 
represented in the study, it is very difficult to say confidently that the results offer a general picture 
of the voting behavior in every district of the two counties. Therefore, the results should be 
approached somewhat cautiously. 
Since the 1881 law's pasture requirement was directed at tenants, and at laborers who were 
worldng their way toward becoming tenants, three new independent variables are created to test 
whether tenants (expected winners and loser) and laborers voted any differently in district referenda. 
The additional variables are interaction terms between each of the tenant coalitions and the laborer 
coalition and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the observation is a district election (1881 
rules), and 0 ifit is a countywide election (1872 rules). The interaction variables are denoted 
"WT*DISTRICT," "LT*DISTRICT," and "LABOR*DISTRICT" in Table 5 .  
Column (2) in Table 5 reports the results of including the interaction terms in the estimation. 
The increased support for the stock law at the district level is difficult to pin down precisely. 
Surprisingly, winning tenants decreased their support for the closed range policy in district elections, 
lowering the stock law's probability of success by 0.032 (relative to a countywide election). This 
result is not statistically significant at conventional levels, however. According to the computations 
in column (2), the coalition oflosing tenants dramatically increased the probability of adopting the 
stock law in a district election by 13.1 percentage points (again, relative to a countywide election). 
Note, however, that because of the relatively small number of districts involved, this estimate is not 
significant at conventional levels. What is statistically significant is the increase in support by 
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laborers voting in district elections. They boosted the stock law's share of the ballots an additional 
12.4 percentage points over the countywide probability. One explanation for this result might be 
that many laborers anticipated a relative quickly move into tenancy, where they would be guaranteed 
pasture by law. An alternative hypothesis might be that the laborers' strong support was the result of 
vigorous canvassing by stock law supporters. Since the district election involved many fewer people 
and a smaller geographic region, it is possible that the transaction costs associated with bribing 
laborers were reduced enough to enable stock law supporters to create a winning coalition that 
included labor acquiescence (compensated, of course). 
It is clear that with the changed election rules, stock law supporters were able to enhance the 
size of their coalition just enough to carry the fence election at the district level. The estimation 
predicts that the stock law could gamer 53.2 percent of the ballots cast in district elections. In a 
democracy, fifty percent is a treshhold - the 1881 district option law was truly successful in 
building a minimum winning coalition. 
Illuminating the Black Box 
Throughout the mid-1880s, Carroll county slowly adopted the stock law district by district 
and by 1891 practically the whole county was under the closed range policy. Figure 2 plots the 
sequence of adoption as a function of the expected net savings in each district. A regression line 
fitted through the data reveals the strong correlation between the net benefits that the institutional 
change promised to generate and the sequence of implementation. In general, this pattern provides 
evidence for the theory that institutional change comes about as the discounted stream of expected 
net benefits exceeds zero. But is positive profitability a necessary and sufficient condition for change 
to take place? 
Net profitability of a proposed institutional change is hardly a sufficient condition for the 
transformation to occur. Before the Georgia General Assembly began to legislate on the fence 
question, transaction costs made a voluntary, large-scale closing of the range virtually impossible. 
A voluntary solution required the unanimous consent of all animal owners to enclose their livestock, 
and a single person could hold up reform. Under the 1872 law allowing majority rule at the county 
level, however, it took more than half of the eligible voters in a county to maintain the status quo. 
With the median voter against reform, sidepayments, or bribes, had to be paid to compensate losers 
(at least a coalition of them) for their expected losses in utility if access to the open range were cut 
off. But again, transaction costs associated with overcoming free riding atnong the beneficiaries and 
the actual process of paying bribes most likely made the 1872 law ineffective. Finally, the 
legislature redesigned the rules of fence elections in 1881. The 1881 pasture requirement apparently 
was designed to compensate at least some of the expected losers. More importantly, the law forced 
all landlords to pay the bribe - free riding was no longer a feasible strategy. 
The 1881 law did more than to provide a mechanism to overcome the compensation and free 
rider problems, it created an opportunity for fence reformers to use chicanery in their attempt to 
close the range. In five instances the Carroll county ordinary threw out invalid votes for the fence 
law, leaving a majority for the new institution. The five districts that had originally voted to keep 
the open range, but later had their votes overturned, are represented by darkened circles in Figure 2. 
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Note that three of the five expected net social losses if the stock law were imposed. Net benefits, 
therefore, need not be a necessary condition for institutional change to take place. The mechanism 
that governs choice can be manipulated in such a way that allows a subset of the population to profit 
at the expense of society as a whole. 
In Jackson county five of thirteen districts and two townships were able to adopt the law in 
the mid 1 880s, but the vast majority of the county maintained the status quo. Recall that Jackson 
would have benefited greatly from the stock law. Therefore, it should not be surprising that Jackson, 
along with many other counties in the same situation, experienced a third rule change - in 1889, by 
special legislative act, the General Assembly declared that Jackson county's range was closed.77 It is 
particularly surprising that most Jackson districts, where the stock law would have generated large 
net benefits, did not even hold a district referendum. One possible hypothesis to explain the less 
than enthusiastic support for fence reform is that the predominant share of voters in Jackson were 
agricultural laborers, amounting to 35 percent of the white voters and 86 percent of the black. 
Conceivably, landowners who had the most to gain from fence reform did not push for a closing of 
the range, fearing that laborers would migrate to neighboring counties that kept the open range. 
Economic theory predicts that the competitive market for labor would have compensated laborers to 
the point where the income of staying with the new institution, plus the compensation, was equal to 
the utility of living in an open range area, less the cost of moving there. If moving costs were just 
about zero, then laborers could have expected their wages to increase enough to make them 
indifferent between staying or leaving. Whether laborers believed that they would actually get the 
wage compensation is certainly a debatable question. From the landowners' point of view, the 
probability of upsetting the equilibrium of the labor force in their district may have made the cost of 
adopting the stock law too great relative to the benefits it may have brought. Therefore, the 
landowners' strategy to maintain the status quo, at least throughout the 1 880s, may have been a 
calculated attempt to keep a steady labor force in Jackson county. 
While Carroll and Jackson counties expected to gain much from the stock law, their relative 
delay in adopting the law illustrates the arduous, dynamic process of institutional change. The 
potential for efficiency gains did not guarantee the replacement of an old by a new institutional 
arrangement. It seems ironic that the proponents of the "new institutional economics" have largely 
ignored the particular rules that are so crucial to the outcome in any specific case. Too often the 
process of change is relegated to a "black box" description which ignores the complex interaction 
between rules and economic outcomes. Future work on institutional change must ask: "What are 
the consequences of a particular set of decision rules? [And] how [do] those decision rules change 
over time and produce alterations in the property rights structure?"" In particular, when transaction 
costs and distributional conflicts hinder the adoption of a relatively profitable institutional 
arrangement, what type of mechanisms are likely to emerge in order to resolve the impasse? More 
attention needs to be paid to the precise arrangements that govern choice, for they will play a 
determining role in whether inefficient institutions persist or whether they are replaced by more 
efficient institutional arrangements. 
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APPENDIX A 
Procedure Used to Calculate Expected Savings from Stock Law 
1.) Wasted Land 
Contemporaries believed that the largest potential source of savings from the stock 
law could be achieved by literally breaking down the fences and bringing into production that 
land previously occupied by fence rows. As discussed in the text, the waste percentage used 
to calculate the individual counties' expected savings is 1.5 percent. When I calculate the 
savings for individual farms, I detemine the percent of wasted land using the function 
specified in footnote 29 below. 
2.) Crops Grown on Wasted Land 
I assume that two types of crop are grown on the wasted acreage. Cotton will be
grown on the cotton producing acres and corn, peas, and fodder will be grown on the com, 
wheat, rye, and oat acres (for simplicity, grain acres). Yield per acre for cotton and com was 
determined by dividing the total crop output by total acres of that particular crop. For the 
com yield per acre measure I subtract 0.25 bushels per acre for seed.79 The yield per acre of 
peas and fodder is assumed to be 4 bushels and 185 pounds, respectively, as reported in the 
"Annual Report of Thomas P. Janes Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Georgia 
For the Year 1 875," p. 135. The total crop of com, peas, and fodder grown on the extra land 
brought into cultivation is equal to the number of extra grain acres times the yield per acre of 
the respective crop. Similarly, the total extra cotton crop is equal to the extra cotton acres 
times the yield per acre of cotton. Since the yield per acre is reported in bales, I multiply the 
total output by 4 75, the average weight of a bale of cotton, to obtain total pounds of extra 
cotton grown. 80 
3.) Gross Value of Crops Grown on Wasted Land 
After finding the total number of bushels or pounds of each crop that could be grown 
on the wasted acreage, I multiply the figure by the price per unit. The price of cotton is 
assumed to be $0. 1 1 1 8  per pound and com is assumed to be $0.673 per bushel. These are the 
average prices for the year 1880 as reported in the Atlanta Constitution. I sampled the 
newspaper once every month, trying to obtain prices for the fourth day of each month. If the 
price was not reported on the fifth, I went to the sixth, seventh, and so on. The price of peas 
is assumed to be $ 1 .10 per bushel and fodder $0.0119 per pound as reported in "The Annual 
Report ... 1875," p. 135. 
4.) Cost of Producing Crops 
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"The Annual Report ... 1 875," p. 135, reports the cost of producing corn, peas, and 
fodder on the same land as $8.00 per acre. Assuming an interest rate of 7 percent, an annual 
land depreciation rate of 2.7 percent81, and a cash value per acre of Georgia fanns of $4.67, 
the cost of producing the corn, peas, and fodder becomes $8.45 per acre. 82 We have the 
benefit of two cost estimates for cotton. "The Annual Report ... 1875," p. 135, reports the 
production cost of cotton to be $16.48 per acre, and includes the cost of marketing the crop. 
R.H. Loughridge, "Report on the Cotton Production of the State of Georgia, with a 
Description of the General Agricultural Features of the State," in the 1880 Agricultural 
Census, p. 175, has several cost estimates for various counties within Georgia. Loughridge's 
figures correspond very closely to the $16.48 reported by the Georgia Department of 
Agriculture and, thus, I use this estimate to predict the total cost of producing the extra cotton 
crop, with one adjustment. The $16.48 figure includes the cost of fencing the acre of cotton 
land. Therefore, the "real" cost of planting an acre of cotton becomes $14.58 (see section 6, 
below, for $1 .90 fence cost). It should be noted that this estimate includes the rental price of 
the land. 
An additional cost of producing the extra crops is the opportunity cost of the capital 
used to work the land, specifically any machinery, farm implements, or draft animals. We 
first determine the value of machinery capital per acre by dividing the "value of fanning 
implements and machinery" by the total number of cotton, corn, wheat, rye, and oat acres. 
To estimate the machinery rent associated with producing the extra crop, I multiply the per 
acre value of machinery by the total acres brought into cultivation by the depreciation and 
interest rate. We take the rate of depreciation to be 15 percent, following Ransom and Sutch, 
p. 108, and Robert C. Allen. 83 Again, the interest rate is assumed to be 7 percent. 
To find the rent associated with work animals, I determine the total value of such 
animals, because the Census reports the value of all fann animals. Using the 1879 prices 
given in the Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957, Series K 
195-212, p. 290, for horses ($51 .55), mules ($57.08), and all cattle ($16.96), I am able to 
estimate the total value of capital in the form of horses, mules, and oxen. By the same 
procedure used for machinery and implements, I determine the value per acre of work 
animals used to produce all crops within a county. Using a depreciation rate of 15 percent 
(Allen, p. 952) and an interest rate of 7 percent, the total rent for animals associated with 
producing the additional crops is the value of work animals per acre times 22 percent times 
the total number of wasted acres brought into cultivation. 
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5.) Dealing with Animals 
Because many animals were roaming the open range, I need to take into account the 
pasturing and feeding of these animals once the hypothetical stock law is implemented. The 
Census reports acres of "Permanent meadows, Permanent pastures, orchards, and vineyards" 
and I take this lump sum to represent the total amount of land devoted to animal pasture. The 
"Annual Report .. .  1 875" gives data on total pasture enclosed by fence, and for more than 80 
counties, the Georgia Department of Agriculture reports a pasture measure greater than the 
Census ' enhanced pasture statistic. Therefore, I do not believe that using the Census pasture 
variable will bias the result in any dramatic fashion. 
To this permanent pasture I allocate animals so that I can obtain an estimate of the 
number of animals that were roaming the countryside. First, I allocate 5 sheep per acre of 
pasturage ("Annual Report. . .  1 875," p. 128), then sequentially allocate one horse, mule, ox, 
milk cow, head of cattle per acre, and if possible, 5 swine per acre. The Jackson Herald, 
August 3 1 ,  1883, reports that six cows and twelve hogs could be put on a six acre pasture 
sown in vetch for the summer. Moreover, the March 30, 1885 Herald reported that one acre 
of pasture per cow was suitable. Given this, one acre devoted to each horse, mule, ox, head 
of cattle, and milk cow is a generous estimate. Furthermore, five pigs per acre seems 
reasonable, given that five sheep per acre was the norm, and taking into account the Herald's 
1883 advice. 
Once I have determined the number of animals that were non-pastured, I must 
deduct from the savings estimate a feed allowance for these animals. Before the stock law is 
instituted, I assume that farmers fed their non-pastured animals the Ransom and Sutch 
"Lower bound" feed estimate reported in Table E.4, p. 250. Once the hypothetical law is 
implemented, these animals must be put into pastures and I assume that they are now fed the 
Ransom and Sutch "Reasonable allowance, 1880" of corn-equivalent bushels. Of course, I 
need not allocate feed to previously pastured animals because I assume they were fed the 
"Reasonable allowance" before and after the law. In fact, the feed allowance only has to be 
made for horses, mules, and oxen because grain given to milk cows, cattle, and swine was 
consumed by the farm family in a different form, namely meat, milk, cheese, butter, etc. 
Therefore, the dollar value of the feed is equal to $0.673/bushel com * (nphorses * 1 1. 7 
bushels + npoxen * 1 1 .7 bushels + npmules * 14.5 bushels), where "np" represents 
11non-pastured." 
6.) Fence Maintenance Savings 
Contemporaries claimed that the depreciation of fences amounted to 10 percent of 
the initial value of the fence. However, as described above, previously non-pastured animals 
require a fence enclosure, and I assume that these animals are penned on unimproved land. 84 
Assume that each non-pastured horse, mule, ox, head of cattle, and milk cow was given one 
acre of land and one acre was allocated for 5 sheep and swine. Call the land used to pasture 
the previously non-pastured animals, "new fenced acres." In addition, I have assumed that all 
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of the fences around crops are removed and, thus, no longer require repair expense. Call the 
amount ofland used to grow the cotton and grain crops before the hypothetical stock law, 
"crop acres." Using the fact that the average cost of fencing in the South was $1.90 per acre, I 
am able to estimate the amount saved from maintaining fewer fences. Thus, the fence 
savings is equal to 0.10 * $1 .90 * (crop acres - new fenced acres). 
I also must take into account the cost of fencing the "new fenced acres" devoted to 
penning the animals. Denoting the one-time cost of this fence as C 0, its value is given by 
$1 .90 * (new fenced acres). 
7.) Total Expected Savings 
The total annual expected savings once the hypothetical law is passed is obtained by 
adding the gross value of the additional crops grown and the money saved from maintaining 
fewer fences and subtracting the total cost of producing the crop, including the rent on the 
capital, and the value of the feed allowance given to previously non-pastured horses, mules, 
and oxen. A general equation for the savings after the first year can be written as: 
Total expected savings (S) =x% cotton acres * [bales/acre * 475 lbs/bale * $0. 1 1 19/lb ­
$14.58 cost/acre - $rent of capital/acre] + x% grain acres * [(bushels corn/acre *
$0.673/bushel + 4 bushels peas/acre * $! . IO/bushel + 185 lbs fodder/acre * $0.01 19/lb) 
- $8.45 cost/acre - $rent of capital/acre] - $0.673/bushel com * [ 1 1.7 bushels * 
nphorses + 1 1 .7 bushels * npoxen + 14.5 bushels * npmules] + 0.10 * $1.90 * [crop 
acres - new fenced acres], 
where x % represents the percentage of tilled acreage wasted by fence rows. The savings of
the first year that the law is in force is slightly different. All of the profits from the crops as 
well as the depreciation from the crop acre fences are realized as savings. However, in the 
first year the full value of C 0 is subtracted off and the depreciation from these fences need not 
-
be subtracted. Thus, the net present value of the expected savings is LS, - 0.9 C 0, where 0.9
t=O 




Assuming that the error terms are distributed according to the logistic cumulative 
distribution, the probability of voting for option j is given by 
(I) 
where X is the matrix of independent variables, P;' is the vector of coefficients, j = (0, 1 }
indexes the voters' possible actions - voting for the fence law or the stock law, respectively, 
and P0 + P 1  = I . Dividing P 1  by P0 reduces to
p 
Taking the log of --
1
- yields 
1 - P 1  
log[ 1 � �J = p,'X - Po'X = <Pi' - Po'lX· 
I will henceforth call the expression <Pi' - Po ')X , WX 




[�] = WX + µ, (4) I - P i 




- log[___!j_] . A Taylor series expansion oflog[ Pi. ] around p1I - Pi 1 - P ,  l - P 1  
yields 
Equation 5 ignores higher order terms of the Taylor expansion. Thus, in large samples, 
E(µ)=(), and
(6) 
In estimating equation 4, then, the error term will be heteroskedastic. A correction is made 
by multiplying both sides of equation 4 by the square root of n ,  the number of eligible voters, 
before estimating it. This estimation is known as the minimum logit chi-squared method. 
The discussion of the above model follows G.S. Maddala, Limited Dependent and 
Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (New Yorlc Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 
29-30. 
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Once J3 has been computed, probability estimates of voting for either option can be 
computed. Algebraically manipulating equation (3), the estimated probabilities of voting for 
the fence law (P 0) and the stock law (P 1) are:
and 
, I Po = -1 + e�x
The final step in determining the estimated probabilities is to specify an i matrix. This is
traditionally done by setting the independent variables at their sample means. 
(7) 
(8) 
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TABLE 1 
DISCOUNTED NET PRESENT VALUE OF EXPECTED PROFIT ABILITY 
OF STOCK LAW, BY REGION 
REGION N WEIGHTED PER CAPITAb AS % 0F VALUE IMPROVED 
MEAN" OF PRODUCE" ACREAGE (%)d 
MOUNTAIN 17 $-12,895' $-2.00' -7.1% 24.3% 
UPCOUNTRY 26 108,769 6.97 16.1 36.9 
PLANTATION 63 167,439 10.31 21.2 42.3 
BELT 
PINE 9 -101,365 -14.96 -35.1 13.0 
BARRENS 
WIREGRASS 16 -81,708 -14.75 -39.2 12.0 
COAST 6 -82,203 �.34 -29.6 12.6 
COUNTIES WTI1l 14 191,195 11.91 21.7 46.8 
LAW BY 1882' 
STATE 137 69,474 5.19 1 1.9 31.4 
CARROLL' 1 119,116 7.05 14.8 36.2 
COUNTY 
JACKSON 1 209,755 12.87 26.7 35.5 
COUNTY 
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Notes: " Weighted by total acres in each county. 
I: ss, 
b The per capita measure was computed according to the following formula: L POP, '
ieR1 
where j indexes the respective region, i indexes the counties within a region, and
"POP" is population. 
' The savings as a percentage of the value of produce measure was computed according to 
I; SS, 
ieR 
the following equation: L �PRD, * 100, where "VPRD" is the value of produce for 
ieR1 
the single year, 1879. To determine the savings as a percent of the net present value 
of the value of produce, multiply the percentage given in the Table by seven percent, 
the interest rate used in the calculation. 
• The column shows the weighted average of the percentage of improved acreage in each
region. The weighting is by total acres in each county. 
' 1880 dollar values. 
f These counties are: Butts (1882), Campbell (1881), Clayton (1881), Coweta (1881), 
Henry (1882), Lincoln (1882), Meriwether (1881), Monroet (1881), Morgan (1882), 
Pike (1882), Putnamt (1881), Rockdale (1882), Spaulding (1882), and Troup 
(1881). Number in parentheses is the year of adoption. A dagger means that the 
legislature imposed the stock law on the county without a popular vote. 
' Since I have a 100 percent sample of the census data from Carroll and Jackson counties, I 
was able to check the aggregate sums presented in the Census with the sums of my 
individual level data. For the most part, the data are consistent. There was one vari­
able, however, that was very different and is important for my calculation - the 
amount of pasture in Carroll. The Census aggregate amount reported is about dou­
ble that calculated using the micro-data. Therefore, in the calculation here, I use the 
smaller estimate. If the Census number is used, the benefit rises to $237 ,667. 
Sources: See Appendix A. 
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TABLE 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED BENEF1TS AND LOSSES FROM STOCK LAW, BY REGION 
RANGE OF MOUNTAIN UPCOUNTRY PLANTATION PINE WIRE- COAST 
BENEFIT/LOSS BELT BARRENS GRASS 
-$250,000 - -$201,000 0 0 0 1 0 0 
-$200,000 --$151,000 1 0 0 1 3 0 
-$150,000 --$101,000 2 0 2 4 5 2 
-$100,000 --$51,000 5 3 0 1 3 3 
-$50,000 --$1 2 1 4 1 4 1 
$0 - $49,000 2 3* 5* 1 0 0 
$50,000 - $99,000 2 3* 13* 0 1 0 
$100,000- $149,000 1 10* 11** 0 0 0 
$150,000 - $199,000 2 4 13**t 0 0 0 
$200,000 - $249,000 0 1 8*t 0 0 0 
$250,000 - $299,000 0 1 3* 0 0 0 
$300,000 - $349,000 0 0 2* 0 0 0 
$350,000 - $399,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
$400,000 - $449,000 0 0 1 0 0 0 
$450,000 - $499,000 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Notes: Each star represents a county that had adopted the stock law by 1882. A dagger indicates a county that had 
the stock law imposed by the state legislature. 



















CARROLL COUNTY - CHARACTERISTICS OF COALITIONS 
VARIABLE PS <: 0 & PS < 0 &  ALL OWNER- PS <: 0 & PS <0 & ALL TENANT-
OWNER OWNER OPERATED FARMS TENANT TENANT OPERATED FARMS 
N 438 983 1421 431 479 910 
MEDIAN 
NET BENEFIT $80.18 -$108.62 -$61.26 $75.44 -$77.72 -$9.25 
TILLED ACREAGE 49.87 44.60 46.22 29.08 29.41 29.25 
COTTON ACREAGE 11.66 9.73 10.33 9.52 8.06 8.75 
PASTURAGE 8.02 0.10 2.54 1.40 om 0.67 
FOREST 85.64 103.20 97.79 16.09 21.63 19.01 
OTHER UNIMPR. 7.53 4.68 5.56 0.68 0.84 0.76 
HORSE 0.46 0.71 0.63 0.15 0.54 0.35 
MULE 0.62 0.87 0.79 0.17 0.56 0.37 
ox 0.15 0.54 0.42 0.03 0.41 0.23 
MILK COW 1.68 1.84 1.79 1.01 1.23 1.12 
CATTLE 2.40 2.76 2.65 1.02 1.45 1 .25 
SWINE 8.18 9.17 8.86 3.31 5.08 4.24 
SHEEP 2.76 5.71 4.80 0.53 2.30 1.46 
PERCENTS 30.8 69.2 - 47.4 52.6 -
Notes and Sowces: The data were collected from the Agricultural Manuscript Schedules, Carroll County (100% sample). 
The expected net benefit was computed using the procedure described in Appendix A. The data reported are 
means for the particular colunm heading. 
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TABLE 4 
JACKSON COUNTY - CHARACTERISTICS OF COALITIONS 
VARIABLE PS 2: 0 & PS < 0 &  ALL OWNER- PS 2: 0 & PS <O & ALL TENANT-
OWNER OWNER OPERATED FARMS TENANT TENANT OPERATED FARMS 
N 378 751 1129 104 240 344 
MEDIAN 
NET BENEFIT $1 16.38 -$120.31 -$58.21 $73.66 -$87.18 -$57.73 
TILLED ACREAGE 68.68 54.34 59.14 34.48 32.62 33.18 
COTTON ACREAGE 21.03 16.01 17.69 15.42 13.69 14.21 
PASTURAGE 9.46 0.29 3.36 5.25 0.06 1.63 
FOREST 101.43 77.97 85.82 58.64 44.37 48.68 
OTHER UNIMPR. 38.62 36.64 37.30 19.56 22.61 21.69 
HORSE 1.10 1.04 1.06 0.54 0.90 0.79 
MULE 0.96 1.10 1.05 0.49 0.83 0.73 
ox 0.13 0.28 0.23 0.08 0.12 0.11 
M!LK COW 2.08 1.95 1.99 1.52 1.62 1.59 
CATTLE 3.10 2.75 2.87 2.04 1.90 1.94 
SWINE 8.82 8.00 8.27 5.60 6.00 5.88 
SHEEP 2.63 4.22 3.69 1.15 1.98 1.73 
PERCENTS 33.5 66.5 - 30.2 69.8 -
Notes and Sources: The data were collected from the Agricultural Manuscript Schedules, Jackson Collllty (100% sam­
ple). The expected net benefit was computed using the procedure described in Appendix A. The data rep::>rted are 
averages for the particular column heading. 
36 
TABLE S 
MARGINAL EFFECTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR THE STOCK LAW" 
(Results are derived from a minimum logit chi-squared estimation) 
VARIABLE (1) (2) 
LABOR• -0. 1 1 1* -0.087* 
WL 0.034*** 0.001 
LL -0.036*** -0.042**
WT 0.064* 0.074** 
LT 0.000 -0.035 
TOWN 0.085* 0.063* 
ABSTAIN 0.048* 0.042** 
WT*DISTRICT - -0.032 
LT*DISTRICT - 0. 131 
LABOR* - 0.124** 
DISTRICT 
f ,  0.255 0.306 
(county)' 
f, - 0.532 
(district) 
N 92 57 
R2 0.323 0.484 
ji2 0.275 0.385 
Notes: 
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* Significant at ,;;0.01 level, two tailed test. 
** Significant at ,;;0.05, but >0.01 level, two tailed test. 
***Significant at ,;;0.10, but >0.05 level, two tailed test. 
• The marginal effects reported are the result of increasing each independent variable 
by one standard deviation from its mean (holding everything else constant) and then 
determining how it changed the baseline probability (all variables set at their means). 
• To determine the marginal effect that laborers had on the vote, I reran an equation 
using LABOR instead of TOWN and determined the marginal effect on that equation. 
' This is the estimated probability of voting for the stock law in a countywide election, 
setting all of the independent variables at their means. The next row reports the 
predicted probability assuming a district election, governed by 1881 rules. 
Sources: Countywide voting returns were collected from the Carroll County Times, January 13, 
1882; Carroll County Times, September 15, 1882; Carroll Free Press, July 3, 1885; 
Carroll Free Press, July 8, 1887; Carroll Free Press, July 4, 1890. Jackson Herald, 
July 8, 1881;  Jackson Herald, September 14, 1883. District referenda returns were col­
lected from the Carroll Free Press, September 18,  1885; Carroll Free Press, March 
1 1, 1887; Carroll Free Press, March 18, 1887; Carroll Free Press, April 1 ,  1887; Car­
roll Free Press, June 24, 1887; Carroll Free Press, July 8,  1887; Carroll Free Press, 
September 9, 1887; Carroll Free Press, December 16, 1887; Carroll Free Press, 
February 22, 1 889; Jackson Herald, October 23, 1885; Jackson Herald, April 23, 
1 886; Jackson Herald, September 2, 1887; Jackson Herald, November 1 1 ,  1887. The 
landowner and tenant coalitions were determined using the procedure detailed in the 
Appendix. All of the coalitions were computed using a 100 percent matched sample of 
the agricultural and population manuscript schedules of Carroll and Jackson counties. 
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TABLE Al 
MEAN DISCOUNTED NET PRESENT VALUE OF EXPECTED PROFITABILITY 
OF STOCK LAW, BY REGION - SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
MODEL (see below) 
REGION N A B c D E F 
MOUNTAIN 17 $-12,962 $-12,845 $-58,943 $-107,304 $-7,821 $-36,604 
UPCOUNTRY 26 158,709 71,315 51,131 -35,099 1 19,289 51,171 
PLANTATION 63 240,455 112,678 145,254 90,239 156,193 84,220 
BELT 
PINE 9 -128,527 -80,992 -161,844 -186,172 -221,549 -98,3% 
BARRENS
WIREGRASS 16 -103,818 -65,125 -103,014 -144,316 -106,084 -78,534 
COAST 6 -106,653 -63,866 -99,943 -143,229 -138,405 -66,666 
COUNTIES WITH 12 297,354 141,775 180,094 1 14,199 203,340 113,387 
LAW BY 1882 
STATE 137 104,770 43,002 35,436 -18,546 48,633 20,438 
CARROLL 1 176,765 75,879 -4,547 -154,756 132,801 52,530 
COUNTY 
JACKSON 1 301,077 141 ,263 103,813 -29,425 188,478 137,720 
COUNTY 
LEGEND OF MODELS: 
A Discount rate set at 5 percent, instead of7. 
B Discount rate set at IO percent, instead of 7. 
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C Reported available pasturage reduced by 25 percent. 
D Reported available pasturage reduced by 50 percent. 
E Prices of cotton and corn were determined by estimating a hedonic pricing model. That is, the value of 
produce grown in the county (reported in the Census) was regressed on the various amount of agricul­
tural produce produced in a county. Individual regions were dummied out so as to determine differences 
in the prices of cotton and corn across regions. The calculation produced the following results (price for 
bale of cotton, price for bushel of corn): Mountain (37.55, 0.55); Upcountry (55.84, 0.39); Plantation 
Belt (44.15, 1.02); Pine Barrens (30.59, 1.48); Wiregrass (49.41, 0.90); Coast (30.59, 1.48). The prices 
used in the original calculation was (53.15, 0.67). 




LENGTH OF RAILROAD TRACK MILEAGE IN GEORGIA, 1860-1889 
5 0 0 0  
4 0 0 0  
3 0 0 0  
2 0 0 0  
1 0 0 0  
1 8 6 0  1 87 0  1 8 8 0  1 8 9 0  
YEAR 
Sources: Poor' s Manual of Railroads of the United States for 1874-5 (New York: J.J. Little & 
Co., 1875), pp. xxviii-xxix; Ibid., 1 885, p. xiv; Ibid., 1890, p. vi. 
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FIGURE 2 
SEQUENCE OF ADOPTION BY EXPECTED SA VIN GS, CARROLL COUNTY 
SEQUENCE 














Source: Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation 
of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 7. 
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level which gives me the opportunity to pick out the salient features of these early stock law 
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